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Abstract  
We examine the evolution and maintenance of defence and conspicuousness in prey species 
using a game theoretic model. In contrast to previous works, predators can raise as well as 
lower their attack probabilities as a consequence of encountering moderately defended prey. 
Our model predicts four distinct possibilities for ESSs featuring maximum crypsis. Namely 
that such a solution can exist with (1) zero toxicity, (2) a non-zero but non-aversive level of 
toxicity, (3) a high, aversive level of toxicity or (4) that no such maximally cryptic solution 
exists. Maximally cryptic prey may still invest in toxins, because of the increased chance of 
surviving an attack (should they be discovered) that comes from having toxins. The toxin 
load of maximally cryptic prey may be sufficiently strong that the predators will find them 
aversive, and seek to avoid similar looking prey in future. However, this aversiveness does 
not always necessarily trigger aposematic signalling, and highly toxic prey can still be 
maximally cryptic, because the increased initial rate of attack from becoming more 
conspicuous is not necessarily always compensated for by increased avoidance of aversive 
prey by predators. In other circumstances, the optimal toxin load may be insufficient to 
generate aversion but still be non-zero (because it increases survival), and in yet other 
circumstances, it is optimal to make no investment in toxins at all. The model also predicts 
ESSs where the prey are highly defended and aversive and where this defence is advertised 
at a cost of increased conspicuousness to predators. In many circumstances there is an 
infinite array of these aposematic ESSs, where the precise appearance is unimportant as long 
as it is highly visible and shared by all members of the population. Yet another class of 
solutions is possible where there is strong between-individual variation in appearance 
between conspicuous, poorly defended prey.  
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Introduction 
There is a very well-developed body of theory pertaining to understanding the prevalences 
of induced and static constitutive defences against attackers: (e.g. Irie & Iwasa, 2005; Shudo 
& Iwasa, 2004; Shudo & Iwasa, 2002; Adler et al., 2001; Shudo & Iwasa, 2001; Iwasa et al., 
1996; Karban & Adler, 1996; VanDam et al., 1996). In such models induced defences have 
the advantage of saving costs associated with the maintenance of constitutive defences but 
the disadvantage that the attacks can flourish until such times as the induced defences kick 
in. Thus, induced defences may be an attractive option when attacks occur over a longer 
timescale of hours or days (examples of this might be attacks on plants by browsing 
herbivores or on animals by viral deseases). In this paper, we are interested in attacks that 
happen on a shorter timescale and which are potentially lethal to attacked individuals (the 
classic example of this being predation). Defences generally cannot be induced fast enough 
to give protection against such rapid attacks, and so potential prey focus on either primary 
defences aimed at reducing the rate of attack (for example, by camouflaging the potential 
prey from predators) or secondary defences that aim to reduce the likelihood that detection 
by a predator results in death.  
 
Secondary defences increase the inclusive fitness of a prey animal by increasing the 
likelihood that it escapes from a predator without serious injury and/or by decreasing the 
probability that the same predator will attack the prey and its relatives in the future. Though 
diverse in form, components of secondary defences can be broadly classified into locomotor 
(rapid escape, protean evasive flight), morphological (spines, tough integuments etc.) and 
chemical (toxins, venoms, noxious secretions etc.) classes. In some cases defences may be 
visually detectable before an attack is launched and function as their own reliable signal to 
predators; the existence of numerous sharp spines or the mode of locomotion of an animal 
may present predators with reliable and detectable cues as to the unprofitability of specific 
prey types.  
 
In many other cases, and especially in examples of chemical defences, the threat posed by 
secondary defences are not easily evaluated by potential predators using external cues in 
prey; here defended prey “require some signal or danger flag which shall serve as a 
warning to would-be enemies not to attack them, and they have usually obtained this in the 
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form of conspicuous or brilliant coloration, very distinct from the protective tints of the 
defenceless animals allied to them” (p. 232, Wallace, 1889). 
 
Thus many, but not all, prey with effective secondary defences possess danger flags in the 
form of more or less conspicuous (“aposematic”) warning displays that help predators 
distinguish edible from unprofitable and dangerous species.  
 
Given that defended prey can vary their degree of conspicuousness, a pertinent question is 
how conspicuous (or how cryptic) should a particular prey be? Conspicuousness is, in many 
prey, directly traded-off against crypsis, such that the benefits that accrue from 
conspicuousness (reduced recognition errors, enhanced wariness, accelerated learning and 
decelerated forgetting processes in predators) are gained at the expense of increased rates of 
detection by predators. Should we expect optimal conspicuousness to increase continuously 
with the strength of a prey animal’s defence, as has recently been suggested (Summers & 
Clough, 2001), or can we expect a more complex relationship between defence and 
conspicuousness? A second, related and important question is; whether (and when) should 
defended prey show between-individual variation in their appearance.   
Defences themselves may be costly and therefore be traded-off against other components of 
fitness. There is a growing body of empirical literature that demonstrates that many chemical 
defences incur fitness costs, either through the costs of biosynthesis or acquisition (via 
sequestration or symbiosis) and storage. Such costs are often seen in reductions in growth, in 
adult size, in fecundity or have been directly measured in energetic terms (Cohen, 1985; 
Zalucki et al., 2001;Bowers & Collinge, 1992; Camara, 1997; Bjorkman & Larsson, 
1991;Rowell-Rahier & Pasteels, 1986; Dobler & Rowell-Rahier, 1994; Grill & Moore, 
1998), although we note that in some circumstances costs have not been detected (Bowers, 
1988; Kearsley & Whitham,1992). Another pertinent question is therefore “how much 
should any given prey invest in its defences?” 
 
Aposematic signals are necessarily co-evolved with the defences that they advertise. These 
signals make the prey more visible to predators (reducing their primary defence of avoiding 
encounters with predators), but have the potential to compensate for this by enhancing 
predator’s learned aversion to defended prey (thereby enhancing secondary defences). To 
date the co-evolution and optimisation of constitutive defences in prey animals and signals 
of those defences have received surprisingly little theoretical attention compared to the 
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economics of induced defences. The model of Leimar et al. (1986) is, however, particularly 
important. This model includes: (1) components of an individual predator’s psychology and 
behaviour (varied learning rates and sensory generalisation in order to calculate attack 
probabilities); (2) the properties of individual prey(continuous variation in effectiveness of 
unprofitability in terms of individual survival and effects on predators’ learning rates, costs 
of a defence, and degree of conspicuousness) and (3) structuring of prey populations(size 
and degree of clustering of prey as a proxy for kin selection). Leimar et al. combine these 
components into a model that determined evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) for the 
continuously-varying parameters of conspicuousness and unprofitability. Their model 
predicts that there can be a single monotypic ESS for some nontrivial level of defence for a 
prey of given conspicuousness. Increases in optimal levels of defence would be caused by: 
(i) increases in survival rates of individuals combined with (ii) a positive relationship 
between learning rate and prey unprofitability provided that there was a capacity for 
predators to confer the benefit of avoidance learning on the same individuals (through 
repeated attacks) or through kin grouping.  
 
Furthermore, Leimar et al. (1986) found that kin grouping, perhaps combined with an 
increase in predation threat, could destabilise crypsis in favour of aposematism, but that, 
once evolved, kin grouping was not necessary for the maintenance of aposematism. When 
aposematism already exists, it could be stabilised by (i) a positive relationship between 
conspicuousness and learning and (ii) a supernormal (or peak-shift-like) response, in which 
the strongest levels of avoidance are conferred on phenotypes that are more conspicuous 
than those generally encountered. The game theoretic approach developed by Leimar et al. 
represents a seminal work in the theory of prey defences and warning signals, providing a 
framework in which the evolution of both traits can be analysed. However we note a number 
of areas that in our view warrant further attention and development.  
 
The model of Leimar et al. (1986) considers a set of naïve predators (initially one individual) 
that start out with an initial “excitatory” attack tendency described as e(x), its generalisation 
gradient due to the “predator’s experience of cryptic and profitable prey of other species”. 
When these naïve predators now meet unprofitable prey, generalised attack probabilities are 
reduced according to an inhibitory gradient h(x,x1,y1) , where x1 is the conspicuousness and 
y1 the unprofitability of the encountered prey individual. Hence, in this model, attack 
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probabilities for a range of prey appearances are determined by a generalisation function of 
the form 
 
G(x)= e(x)[1- h(x,x1,y1)]n where n is the number of previous encounters between predator 
and prey.  
 
Although now close to 20 years old, the model of Leimar remains the dominant work on the 
coevolution of defences and signals of those defences (see Ch. 8 of Ruxton et al. 2004). No 
other published models in aposematism theory consider the joint evolution of primary and 
secondary defences (though see recent and related models in: Speed & Ruxton, 2005; 
Merilaita & Tullberg, 2005); other models focus specifically on the evolution of aposematic 
displays ignoring the fact that aposematism contains an ensemble of primary and secondary 
defences.  Since the model of Leimar et al. (1986) was constructed to explicitly examine the 
effects of individual predator psychology on aposematic evolution, their formulation is 
entirely reasonable. However, the implication of this component of the model is that the 
predator can reduce its range of generalised attack probabilities, because of repeated 
inhibitory effects, but it cannot ever raise it. Whichever prey gets attacked, whatever their 
appearance and toxicity, whatever the outcome, the aversion of the predator increases for 
every further prey individual encountered, or at least cannot decrease. However, this is 
clearly not an appropriate long-term strategy for a predator, as it must necessarily  
lead to ever decreasing uptake rates.  In addition, we argue in this paper that the generality of 
the results described in Leimar et al. (1986) can in some cases be hard to evaluate, as they 
select specific functional forms at the outset. A more general model of predation may 
provide a more flexible framework for evaluation.  
 
In this paper we therefore examine the evolution of conspicuousness and defence in 
defended species with a complementary model to that of Leimar et al. (1986). We assume 
that the secondary defence is a form of toxicity (though it can clearly be extended beyond 
this) and present a model that we strive to make as general as possible whilst still being 
capable of making useful specific predictions. Thus, rather than describe the effects of 
learning in individual predators, a set of predators is modelled here as a group in equilibrium 
for states of learning, hunger etc.   
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Furthermore, in the model described here, predators can both lower and raise their attack 
probabilities with prey that contain modest quantities of toxins (Sherratt et al., 2004). We 
use the model to investigate (1) the relationship between defence and the appearance of a 
prey when the levels of mortality from causes other than predation and the degree of kin 
grouping varies; (2) the optimal level of conspicuousness for a range of toxicity levels; and 
(3) the extent to which optimal toxicity can be affected by the appearance of an animal and 
the degree of kin grouping within the population.  
 
Model Description 
We consider a single population of individuals that are potentially prey to a predator. Each 
prey individual i is described by three parameters {ti, ri, θi}. The parameter ti describes the 
toxicity (or, more generally, investment in anti-predatory defence) of individual i, with 
increasing values indicating increasing toxicity, and ti = 0 indicating minimal investment in 
toxicity. The parameter ri describes the conspicuousness of individual i (or more generally 
the probability of detection upon encounter with a predator is an increasing function of ri). 
Increasing values of ri indicate increasing conspicuousness, with r = 0 indicating maximum 
crypsis. The final parameter θi also describes the appearance of the individual, but such that 
changes in θ affect the appearance of the individual without affecting its conspicuousness. 
Thus two prey types can be equal in conspicuousness against the background (have identical 
r values) but be very different in appearance from each other (have different θ values. For 
example two brightly coloured butterfly species can be equally easy to detect against the 
background foliage but can still be identified as distinct species. The most common 
definition for crypsis is due to Endler (1978): “a colour pattern is cryptic if it resembles a 
random sample from the background…”. As Endler himself pointed out, a key consequence 
of the concept of random samples is that two different patterns (being to different random 
samples of the background) can be equally easily detectable.  This suggests that two 
individuals can look different (i.e. have different t values in our model) but have the same 
likelihood of detection (identical r values): see Ruxton et al. pp 13 (2004) for further 
discussion.  Thus r and θ are orthogonal axes that together describe the parameter space of 
possible appearance. Without loss of generality, we assume that these axes are polar rather 
than Cartesian, θ taking values in (0,2pi). We are interested in finding the evolutionarily 
stable values of {ti, ri, θi}.  
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A key assumption of the model is that toxin production is expensive. We describe this by 
assuming that the fecundity of an individual F is a decreasing function of ti. However, there 
is also a direct benefit to toxicity in that increasing investment in toxicity increases the 
likelihood of surviving a predatory attack. Specifically, we assume that if the predator 
attacks a prey item then the probability that the prey is captured (K) is a declining function 
of t.  
 
There is another way that toxicity can affect survivorship and this is by influencing the 
probability that upon encountering an individual prey item, the predator decides to attack 
that particular prey individual. This probability (denoted by Q) declines with the 
aversiveness of the experiences that the predator is likely to have previously had (and 
subsequently remembered) on attacking similar looking prey items. Let us consider a 
predator attacking individual i. We first of all need to define “similar looking” individuals to 
individual i. We do this with a function S(ri,θi, rj, θj), which is a measure of the visual 
similarity between individuals i and j.  S increases as the points { ri,θi} and {rj,θj} get closer 
together; in particular in this paper we treat S as a univariate function of the Euclidian 
distance between the two species (see Appendix 1). We also have to describe the 
aversiveness of an experience with a prey item, which we do with function H. Specifically 
H(tj) is the aversiveness of attacking individual j. Positive values of H indicate an aversive 
experience; the higher the toxicity, the more positive H is and so the more aversive the 
experience. However, if an individual’s investment in toxins is low then the experience of 
attacking it may not be aversive at all, indeed the predator may treat it as a beneficial 
experience. We describe such situations by a negative value of H. We define the critical 
value of toxicity (tc) as that which produces a neutrally aversive response: 
 
( ) 0=ctH          (1) 
 
This non-zero value of tc represents the phenomenon that prey may have to invest non-
trivially in defence to become sufficiently aversive as to be unattractive to predators. That is, 
predators may be prepared to still consume prey with some mild aversive features, because 
the rewards of nutritional content are worth this small cost. We also need to describe 
encounter rates between the predator and prey, and the ease with which they are 
subsequently remembered. We assume that the rate that an individual of conspicuousness r 
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is detected by a predator (i.e. the rate that it is encountered by a predator multiplied by the 
probability it is detected when it encounters it) is D, where D is an increasing function of r 
but even maximally cryptic prey have some chance of being detected (i.e. when r=0, 
D(r)>0). The rate at which such encounters occur and are later recalled by the predator is L, 
where L too is an increasing function of r. If the predator has perfect recollection of all 
encounters then L = D. Drawing all this together, on encountering individual i, then the 
available information to the predators (scaled by the total number of predators) on the 
attractiveness or aversiveness of that prey item (denoted Ii) can be calculated as follows 
 
( ) ( ) ( )jjiijN
ijj
ji rrStHrL
n
I θθ ,,,1
,1
∑
≠=
=       (2) 
 
where N is the number of prey items in the population and n is the number of predators. We 
shall take this as our measure of the information that an average predator has about 
individual i. When this individual meets a predator, we assume that it is equally likely to be 
any of the n available, so that the predator will on average have this information about its 
aversiveness. It shall be further assumed that the population is in equilibrium, and its size is 
sufficiently large, so that any individual encounter has no effect on the population size. We 
assume that on encountering individual i, the probability of the predator  mounting an attack 
is Q(Ii) and Q declines with increasing Ii. Note that the larger the prey population, the more 
encounters each predator is likely to have and so the more information it has. This in turn 
means that a predator’s preference will be more clearly defined, and for a large population I 
will tend to be a large positive or large negative value so that Q willbe closer to 0 or 1. 
  
We must now describe the fitness of individual i. We assume that there is a background 
mortality rate λ. From our arguments above, the rate of predator-induced mortality on this 
individual is D(ri)K(ti)Q(Ii), and so the fitness of individual i can be described by  
 
 
)()()(
)(
iii
i
IQtKrD
tF
+λ . 
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It is this fitness function that we use in our ESS calculations, where we consider inclusive 
fitness assuming that the average relatedness between individuals is a. Note, since we are 
only interested in situations where the population is at equilibrium, this fitness description is 
equivalent to the alternative per capita rate of increase. Our key results are presented in the 
next section, with some of the ESS calculations outlined in Appendix 1. It should be noted at 
this point that a strategy which can be attained through small, selectively advantageous steps 
is called convergence stable. We only demonstrate when strategies in our model  are 
resistant to such changes, and do not show that strategies are convergence stable.  
 
Results  
We begin by considering the payoff function derived in the previous section and how it can 
be used to find ESSs. 
 
Relative payoffs   
We represent the average relatedness of individuals in the “local” area by a. We assume that 
the population in this area consists of a proportion of identical individuals a which plays the 
strategy t,r,θ, the remaining members of the population being unrelated to this group and 
playing 111 ,, θrt . 111 ,, θrt  is an ESS if and only if the reward to a 111 ,, θrt -individual in such 
a population is greater than the reward to a t,r,θ-individual, for any possible set of alternative 
parameters t,r,θ. We shall consider local ESSs only, where it is assumed that alternative 
strategies are mutations which are very close to the original values.  
 
The payoff to an individual playing a mutant strategy is given by  
 
)()()(
)(),,;,,( 111 IQtKrD
tF
rtrtP
+
= λθθ                              (3) 
                  
where 
)},,,,()()()1(),,,()()({ 1111 θθθθ rrStHrLarrStHraL
n
NI −+=      
))cos(2(),,,( 1122111 θθθθ −−+= rrrrSrrS                                     
and S(0)=1. 
The payoff to a resident (averaged over a much larger area) is 
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where 
)()( 111 tHrL
n
NI =  
I  is the toxicity information for the mutant in the local area, and 1I  is the toxicity 
information for the resident over the larger area (essentially unaffected by the mutant). To 
obtain the inclusive fitness for both mutant and resident the payoffs should be multiplied by 
the term (1+a(N-1)); we leave this term out as it has no effect on our results.  
 
We explore the different types of ESS possible in our model in this section. We break this 
down by considering the different types of conspicuousness (r1) in turn.  
 
Optimal toxicity 
 
The ESS value of t can be found by solving the following equation at 111 ,, θθ === rrtt . 
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This solution is stable if 
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We can thus use this condition to check stability for any particular situation, although it is 
not possible to verify that such solutions are always stable. 
 
Note that it is also possible for 1t =0 to be stable, which occurs if  
 
0)0,( 11 <rg                                   (4c) 
 
For the sake of simplicity we shall assume that there is precisely one value of 1t  which 
satisfies condition (4a), or alternatively (4c) for any given 1r  (a reasonable assumption for 
well behaved functional forms).  We show in Appendix 1 that whenever 1I >0 (t> ct ), the 
(unique) optimal value of t increases as r increases, so if optimal toxicity is aversive for any 
value of 1r , it is for all larger values of r, under reasonable assumptions.  Thus for each such 
appearance there is an equilibrium level of toxicity (t1) given by equation (4a), provided that 
this yields a non-zero toxicity, where the information of toxicity is given by  
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(5) 
since N is large.  
 
i) ESS featuring maximal crypsis (i.e. r = 0)  
Appendix 1 demonstrates that there will be an ESS with r = 0, if and only if we satisfy the 
condition: 
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where we represent the average relatedness of individuals in the “local” area by a, 
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= , and t1 is the ESS level of toxicity, which is found by 
substituting r1 =0 in equation (4a).                      
  
 
Note that it is also possible for 1t =0 to be stable, which occurs if  
 
0)0,0(1 <g                                         (7) 
 
This set of equations can only be solved iteratively once specific functional forms for all the 
functions and all parameter values have been specified. But the results in Appendix 1 do 
allow us to draw general conclusions about the type of maximally cryptic ESSs that are 
possible. Specifically, there is an ESS with maximum crypsis and minimal investment in 
toxins (i.e.  r= 0, t = 0) provided that inequalities (6) and (7) are satisfied.  
 
However, it is also possible for the ESS to involve significant investment in toxins without 
this triggering a change from maximally cryptic appearance. That is, there is an ESS with (r1 
= 0 and t1 > 0), if equation (4a) and inequality (6) are satisfied. 
 
 
ii) ESS with warning colouration ( i.e. r > 0)  
One result from Appendix 1 is that individuals will never give up on maximal crypsis unless 
there is investment in toxins. That is, there is never an ESS with r1 > 0 and t1 = 0. In fact, 
there is no ESS with r1> 0, unless the associated toxin investment is sufficiently strong to be 
aversive (i.e. t1> tc). However an ESS with r1> 0 can exist providing that equation (4a) is 
satisfied, together with 
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However, an interesting aspect to this case, is that we demonstrate in Appendix 1 that when 
an ESS with warning colouration is possible, then there is no unique ESS, indeed, there is an 
infinite number of ESSs. Specifically, under reasonable conditions on the parameters, there 
will be a lower critical value of r (denoted R), and all values r > R, have a unique value of t 
such that {r,t(r)}is an ESS. This critical value of R is given by  
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The value of t(r) (obtained from equation (4a)) always increases with increasing r, and so we 
predict a strong correlation between investment in toxicity and conspicuousness of 
aposematic signals.  
 
iii) ESSs where there is heterogeneity in appearance between individuals.  
For the ESSs that have been discussed so far, the value of θ has been irrelevant. For 
maximally cryptic solutions with r = 0, it is easy to see that there is no selection pressure on 
the value of θ. For the ESSs with aversive prey (t1 > tc) and warning colouration (r > 0), it is 
clear there is now strong selection pressure on θ, but this selection pressure drives the 
population towards homogeneity in this parameter, the final parameter value settled upon is 
irrelevant providing all individuals adopt the same value (i.e. all individuals look alike).  
 
However, in Appendix 1 we demonstrate that there are situations where the prey contains no 
toxins or some moderate level of toxin but is not aversive in the sense that predators increase 
their willingness to attack similar looking prey in future (t1 < tc) where the solution is more 
complicated. Here, the evolutionarily stable appearance is not full crypsis (i.e. r1 > 0). This 
is due to the fact that looking very similar to other non-toxic cryptic individuals outweighs 
the benefit of the extra crypsis. Some “aposematic distinctiveness” (in the sense of A.R. 
Wallace’s original formulation) from more edible prey types is therefore optimal, even 
though the prey is not outrightly aversive. Such a solution will only occur when a small 
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decrease in crypsis (a small increase in r) does not cause a large increase in encounter rate 
(D(r)). 
 
Discussion 
 
We first consider the general classes of possible ESS solution and subsequently consider 
how variation in the value of key variables determines which solution(s) is most likely. 
Finally we compare the model described in this paper with the original model in Leimar et 
al.(1986). 
 
Evolutionary stable outcomes 
 
Our model predicts four distinct possibilities for a solution with maximum crypsis (r=0). 
Namely that (1) such a solution exists with zero toxicity (t=0),(2) it exists with a non-zero 
but non-aversive level of toxicity (0<t<tc), (3) it exists with a high, aversive level of toxicity 
(t>tc) or (4) that no such maximally cryptic solution exists. That is, under some, but not all 
circumstances, an ESS involving the prey all minimising the rate at which they are detected 
by predators occurs. Interestingly, maximally cryptic prey may still invest in toxins, because 
of the increased chance of surviving an attack that comes from having toxins. The toxin load 
of maximally cryptic prey may be sufficiently strong that the predators will find them 
aversive, and seek to avoid similar looking prey in future. However, this aversiveness does 
not necessarily trigger aposematic signalling, and highly toxic prey can still be maximally 
cryptic, because the increase in rate of attack from becoming more conspicuous is not 
necessarily always compensated for by increased avoidance of aversive prey by predators. In 
other circumstances, the optimal toxin load may be insufficient to generate aversion but still 
be non-zero (because it increases survival), and in yet other circumstances, it is optimal to 
make no investment in toxins at all.  
 
Each of these four possibilities may (for some combinations of parameter values) exist as the 
only ESS (which we label as situation a). However there are also combinations of parameter 
values where each type of maximally cryptic ESS exists alongside a range of non-cryptic 
ESSs, which involve aversive levels of toxins (we label such situations b).   Any such non-
cryptic solution is more stable the larger the information of the toxicity of that appearance 
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(thus conditions are often given in terms of 1I  is greater than some value). Under reasonable 
conditions the solution pair r,t(r) are stable for values of r above a given threshold R, so that 
multiple (infinite) solutions exist in many circumstances. Effectively, if an animal is 
conspicuous enough to be easily seen and this indicates high toxicity so that predators avoid 
it, it does not matter exactly which level of conspicuousness the prey individuals choose as 
long as everyone looks the same.  
Any animal that changes its appearance will suffer, so all levels of conspicuousness above a 
certain threshold are stable.  
 
Higher levels of conspicuousness are generally associated with higher levels of toxicity. 
Thus there are eight distinct scenarios (1-4,a-b), between each of which we can specify 
(admittedly complex) boundary conditions in terms of the values given to parameter values.  
 
Note that it is possible that there is no solution either with r=0 or r>0, where all individuals 
are identical in toxicity and appearance. In this case, the solution will have the population of 
prey individuals uniformly spread across all θ values. They need not all have identical r 
values, and in general will not. Generally we expect a critical maximum value of r, below 
which all prey select values. Again increasing r will be associated with increasing (or at least 
non-decreasing) toxicity. Such non-point solutions occur when prey seek to be different 
from others, to disrupt associative learning. In our model increased between-individual 
separation in appearance is associated with increased conspicuousness (and so increased 
attack rates). It is this trade-off between minimising attack rates and maximising visual 
difference from other prey that generates this heterogeneous-appearance ESS.  
 
Whilst we have found the (local) ESSs for each scenario, we have not considered the 
convergence stability of each solution. It is likely that when there is a unique cryptic ESS 
then this will be globally stable, and we have discussed the case where there is no pure 
solution above. When there are aposematic ESSs, there are an infinite number of them, and 
the situation will be much more complicated. It is not clear that all the ESSs will be able to 
be reached by repeated localised mutations. It is possible that starting from crypsis, the 
lowest value of r which can be stable, the lower bound R, will always be attained. It is also 
possible that there will be a non-point solution as well as the aposematic point solutions, so 
that none of these aposematic  ESSs can be reached from crypsis. It is unclear what dynamic 
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behaviour will occur from a starting point where r>0. One thing that we can say is that close 
to any point solution evolution in the direction of r is likely to be stronger than that in the 
direction of t because of the discontinuity in the derivative in this direction so that although 
analysis is likely to be complicated, it may effectively reduce to the one dimensional case, 
and depend crucially on expressions (4a-c). Also there can be a single cryptic solution as 
well as many aposematic solutions, and the behaviour here may again be different. We have 
not even begun to address these interesting dynamic questions, which will be reserved for 
later work.  
 
Key parameters and the nature of the ESS  
 
Rather than solve our equations for specific cases of functional responses and parameter 
values, we can make general statements about the influence of our various parameters on 
which solutions are likely to occur. For any particular value of r there is a unique optimal 
value of toxicity t. In general for r>0 the higher t is in conjunction with r, the more likely it 
is to be stable against changes in appearance (higher t means higher 1I , see (5) and (6)). 
Increasing the level of deaths from other causes λ reduces the value of t for a given r, and so 
reduces the likelihood of the solution being stable, and reduces the stable range of non-
cryptic solutions. This makes sense since, as the influence of predation declines, the value of 
deterrence declines relative to the decreased fecundity of higher toxicity. Increasing the level 
of relatedness a increases the toxicity level that is optimal for any given r, and makes that 
solution more likely to be stable. In general increasing relatedness increases the range of 
non-cryptic stable solutions. The higher the relatedness, the closer the individual best 
strategy is to the group optimum, which tends to be higher toxicity and conspicuousness. 
The strategy is less liable to cheating (copying appearance with less toxicity), since, if you 
cheat, you harm your relatives whilst helping yourself.  
 
If we substitute some plausible functional forms for the general functions used in the model, 
then we gain some further insights. Specifically Appendix 2 demonstrates that high toxicity 
tends to occur when the population of prey is large, the relatedness in the population is large, 
detection probability is large (even when maximally cryptic), learning occurs quickly, 
fecundity declines slowly with toxicity, the probability of attack declines quickly with 
information of toxicity and the level of toxicity needed to be aversive is large.  
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Note that when death can only occur through predation (i.e. λ = 0) and relatedness has no 
effect (a = 0), there is an optimal toxicity independent of appearance. This can be explained 
by the fact that each individual just finds its best level (any population using some trade-off 
between toxicity and appearance is invaded by an individual with identical appearance and 
optimal toxicity). When other mortality factors and/or relatedness feature, then there is an 
optimal level of toxicity for any appearance. 
 
The present model compared to that of Leimar et al. (1986) 
 
The key difference between the model of Leimar et al. and ours is the assumptions about the 
predator population. In their model, there are essentially a group of new predators emerging 
at the start of a season and then continuing to learn over time, so that learning causes 
changes in the predation pressure over time. This is, in our view, eminently reasonable in a 
study that aims to examine the initial origins of aposematism, in which all predators were 
initially naïve. Here, by contrast, we consider an equilibrium situation, where there is no 
change in predation pressure over time. The equilibrium level may have been reached by 
learning, or genetic inheritance or a combination of the two. However the equilibrium is 
maintained essentially because there is always a balanced mix of young and old individuals 
in overlapping generations. After the initial evolution of aposematism, the Leimar et al. 
model might thus correspond ecologically to seasonal predators such as wasps, and ours to 
more long-lived predators, such as birds and lizards. 
 
Note that in Leimar et al’s model solution (2) – where there is non-zero investment in toxins 
but not sufficient to cause aversion -  is not possible as (in their model) all non-zero t are 
aversive, and learning can never make a predator more likely to eat something, so as time 
goes on all prey individuals are in less and less danger. Leimar et al’s solutions can include a 
maximally cryptic ESS with either no investment in defences (solution 1) or with defences 
sufficient to cause aversion (solution 3) with a single ESS r>0, as opposed to the range of 
solutions r>R that we generate.  
 
It should be noted that Leimar’s solutions are not true co-evolutionary ESSs, in the sense 
that they fix one parameter (e.g. t)and then find the optimal solution with the other. If we did 
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this, our model would also yield (at most) one stable solution r>0. Conversely if both of 
their parameters were allowed to vary simultaneously it is possible that solutions similar to 
ours would be generated. Indeed it seems logical that a range of r values would be stable. 
The non-cryptic solutions rely on predators recognising the prey and avoiding them. Thus 
any appearance that is sufficiently visible may suffice, as long as all individuals of the 
species look the same. 
 
Leimar et al’s model always yields at least one point solution (i.e. where all individuals have 
identical appearance). Ours yields no point solution under some circumstances. In this case 
the benefits of crypsis are outweighed by the similarity of appearance to other edible forms, 
and a spread of appearances to dilute the information the predator receives about the 
attractiveness of this type of prey is optimal.  
 
One of Leimar et al’s key predictions was that a non-cryptic ESS could only occur if 
predators are reluctant to attack prey that are more conspicuous than those so far 
encountered, or that faster learning occurred with the more conspicuous individuals. This is 
not necessary in our model, which has ESSs where there is no greater tendency to avoid the 
more conspicuous individuals, unless there is evidence that they are toxic; indeed the precise 
mechanisms of learning are not central to our model as they are to Leimar et al’s (although 
they indirectly affect it through the functions H(t) and L(r)) , as explained above). Leimar 
concludes that an increased level of survival of attacks with t>0 is important to allow ESSs 
featuring non-zero investment in defence to exist, and we are in full agreement with this 
conclusion. 
  
Conclusions 
 
There has been recent speculation (Summers & Clough,2001),that there may be a positive 
relationship between the conspicuousness of aposematic signals and the strength of the 
defence that they advertise. Here we present the first explicit mathematical model that can 
explore this suggestion, and our model predictions support this conjecture. These predictions 
rest to some extent upon an assumption, which we consider reasonable, about how our 
functions manifest themselves in nature (see some discussion on this in Appendix 1).    
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Our model makes the novel prediction that if conditions support the evolution of a 
sufficiently strong defence that the prey are aversive and advertise that defence in a 
conspicuous appearance, then a broad range of alternate ESSs are possible. The specific ESS 
reached depends on the history of a particular local prey population. Hence, the model 
suggests that the great diversity of levels of defence and appearance of aposematic prey does 
not necessarily require special explanation but is an emergent consequence of the co-
evolution of defence and signal of that defence.  
 
The theoretical literature in relation to secondary defences is currently unclear about whether 
or how much we can expect cryptic prey to be defended. Leimar et al. (1986) and also Speed 
& Ruxton (2004) both suggest that when the threat from predators is small cryptic prey 
should not invest in secondary defences. However, many other authors assume that cryptic 
prey can in fact be highly defended (e.g. Harvey et al., 1982; Yachi &Higashi, 1998; 
Servedio, 2000; Speed, 2001; Brodie & Agrawal, 2001). In this work, we predict that in 
some cases (with high costs and/ or low predation risk) maximally cryptic prey will be 
undefended. In other cases such as when there is a higher risk of predation they will be 
defended but only moderately: sufficiently to enhance individual survivial but not 
sufficiently to make them aversive to predators. In still other cases prey will be sufficiently 
defended to be aversive but still choose not to signal this if the costs of conspicuousness are 
too great. One important consequence is that aposematic coloration is not necessarily the 
optimal state for prey that possess substantial defences. Many of the results in this paper rest 
on the assumptions of stability and uniqueness of the optimal toxicity for any given 
appearance. The general nature of the model, and the complexity of the payoff function, has 
meant that we were unable to prove this is always true. Indeed, there will certainly be 
functional forms where this uniqueness will not occur, although we maintain that these are 
biologically unlikely. There may be cases where the assumption of stability is untrue, which 
could lead to polymorphism within the population, although we have not been able to find 
this. Such solutions, if they exist, would inevitably be more complex and would probably 
require significant simplification of the model to investigate. Our model also makes the 
novel prediction of a stable prey strategy that involves very high levels of variability in 
appearance in prey, combined with moderate and variable levels of defence. At present 
expectation in many theoretical models is that pro-apostatic selection favours diversity in 
edible, undefended prey populations but that as soon as there is any level of defence 
selection becomes anti-apostatic, favouring uniformity (Mallet & Joron, 1999). However we 
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indicate here that one class of stable evolutionary result is a combination of some moderate 
investment in secondary defence with high levels of diversity in the prey appearance.  
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Appendix 1: Derivation of ESS solutions   
 
Optimal toxicity for a given level of conspicuousness 
 
),( 111 trg  is increasing with 1r  provided that 1I >0, )(/)()( / iQiiQiV −=  is increasing with 
positive i at the critical value  1r  and )()( 11 IQrD increases with 1r  (or at least does not 
decrease sufficiently quickly) at this value. Increasing conspicuousness (r1)will certainly 
increase the rate at which prey are detected by predators (D). However, increasing r1 will 
increase I1, which in turn will decrease the probability that that detection leads to attack (Q). 
So the rate of attack (the product DQ) could in principle increase, decrease, or in the limiting 
case stay the same as conspicuousness (r1) increases. Indeed it would be possible to pick 
functional forms to achieve all these possible effects. However we consider that for the 
overwhelming majority of biologically plausible formulations D will increase faster with 
r1than Q decreases, and so the product DQ will increase with increasing r1. Our arguments 
are as follows. As the prey becomes more conspicuous (r1 increases) then the range of 
distances over which it can be detected will increase. Since almost all prey live in habitats 
where predator-prey interactions occur in two or three dimensions, a small increase in 
detection distance can lead to a large increase in encounter rate (D), because of the 
geometric effect. Although increasing conspicuousness will reduce the likelihood of an 
encounter leading to an attack, this probability will not be affected by geometry in the same 
way, so we would not expect this probability (Q) to decrease quickly enough with increasing 
r to compensate for the dramatic increase in D with increasing conspicuousness. Further, we 
would expect Q to be a saturating function of conspicuousness r1 (see discussions of 
learning and discrimination in Pearce & Bouton, 2001; Servedio, 2000; Roper &Redston, 
1987; Gamberale-Stille, 2001). The mechanism that causes the predator to attack 
conspicuous defended prey is confusing them with other prey types that are defended and 
cryptic, once conspicuous has increased sufficiently that such confusion is unlikely, further 
increases in conspicuousness will have little effect on Q. In contrast, there is less reason to 
expect a similar saturating effect whereby increasing conspicuousness does not lead to 
increased encounter rates without imposing special assumptions of the habitat structure of 
animal movement. So again, from this reason our expectation is that the product DQ will 
increase with increasing conspicuousness (increasing r1). 
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It should be noted here that these conditions are sufficient, but not necessary, so for instance 
if V(i) is increasing rapidly, then  )()( 11 IQrD  could be decreasing (as long as this is not too 
quickly) with the same result. In fact there is a link between these two assumptions. If 
L(r)=K D(r) for some constant K (reasonable given the relationship between these two 
functions) then )()( 11 IQrD  increasing is the same result as V( 1I )<1. We shall assume that 
these results are true. Similarly at 0),( 111 =trg , the function decreases with t under our 
assumption of a unique solution, since there is either a unique solution with 01 =t and 
0)0,( 11 <rg or 0)0,( 11 >rg and there is a unique solution with 0),( 111 =trg .  
Thus under our assumptions there is a unique solution for 1t for every 1r , which is increasing 
with 1r .   
 
So any solution must include this optimal level of toxicity. We next proceed to find the 
values of 1r  and 1θ  which can be stable in conjunction with this. Note that in the special case 
where λ=a=0, the optimal level of toxicity is independent of appearance (but not of 
aversiveness, as it affects this through H(t)). 
 
It may seem strange that optimal toxicity can be independent of appearance. However, 
natural selection acts at the level of the individual, and a stable solution is one that cannot be 
beaten by an invader. Any situation where the population does not choose the level of 
toxicity dictated by the trade-off between F and K, e.g. to be more toxic to deter predation, 
will be invaded by individuals which have the same appearance but choose the trade-off 
level.  
 
In the case where λ is non-zero (but a=0), there is a link between optimal t and appearance, 
for the sole reason that appearance affects the relative contribution of predation and other 
factors to mortality (given by λ/)()()( 111 tKIQrD ).  
There is thus a unique value of 1t  which is the optimal toxicity level for any given 1r . We 
have to find which value(s) of 1r , if any, give ESSs.  
 
The maximum crypsis solution (r1=0)  
 
 27
Firstly we look at the possibility of a solution with 1r =0 (note that this automatically means 
that the value of 1θ  is irrelevant).We only need to consider invasion by larger values of r, 
i.e. show that  
0),0,;,,( 1111 <∂
∂ θθ trtP
r
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The second term is positive for some functions L(r) and S(y) (and for sufficiently small a) if 
and only if H( 1t )>0. In this case 1r  =0 is clearly stable.  
 
This means that for some functional forms being completely cryptic is always an ESS 
providing the best value of t is sufficiently toxic to be aversive, in the sense of reducing 
attacks by predators.  
 
Other point solutions (r1>0)  
 
If 01 >r  then the value of 1θ  is relevant, and we have to consider invasion by both larger 
and smaller values of r and different values of θ. Considering 1θθ =  initially, we are 
interested in the derivative  
),,;,,( 11111 θθ rtrtP
r∂
∂
 
which is discontinuous at 1rr = due to the similarity function S. The derivative becomes 
|)(|),(),(),,;,,( 111311211111 rr
r
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For a stable solution we need this derivative to be positive for 1rr < and negative for 1rr > . 
This is equivalent to 
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0),(),( 113112 <− trgtrg                                                       (14a) 
0),(),( 113112 >+ trgtrg                                                        (14b) 
 
Note that the discontinuity in the derivative at 1r  means that there is not a unique 
equilibrium value and the conspicuousness level 1r  is stable provided that (14) is satisfied. 
Equation(14a) is more difficult to satisfy than (14b) (unless a is unrealistically large) It is 
easy to see that it is impossible to satisfy this for H( 1t )<0 ( 1I  <0). If H( 1t )>0 then we 
require  
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Allowing 1θθ ≠  does not impose any further restrictions (invasion by such a strategy is 
easier to resist whenever H( 1t )>0).Any solution satisfying conditions (4) and (15) is thus 
stable. 
 
On the (reasonable) assumption that )(/)(/ rDrD is decreasing, then if either L(r)=K D(r) 
for some constant K or a is small, 111 ,, θrt  is a local ESS if R < 1r < ∞ for some critical value 
R (in addition to the possible crypsis 01 =r  solution). This is a sufficient condition only; this 
result may occur even if the above is not satisfied. (Similarly, the result may hold even if 
)()( 11 IQrD does not increase with 1r , and because of the discontinuity in the derivative of 
the fitness function with respect to r, the local ESSs are likely to occur for values of 1r  lying 
in an interval).  This value of R may be infinite, which would mean that no solution with 
01 >r  exists. 
 
To see this, consider the following. The criterion (15) reduces to 
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where the right-hand side of the above is positive. Given that optimal 1t does not decrease 
with 1r , then 1I increases with it so that the left-hand side of the above increases whilst the 
right-hand side decreases. Thus the critical value R is given by 
 






−−−= )(
)()1)(0()(
)()(
/
/
/
1 RL
RL
aaS
RD
RDIV                           (16) 
 
Solution summary 
 
t=0 and r=0when 0)0,0(1 <g , 0)0,0()0,0( 32 >+ gg  
 
t>0 and r=0when 0),0( 11 =tg , 0),0(),0( 1312 >+ tgtg  
t=0 and r>0can never occur 
t>0 and r>0when 0),( 111 =trg  ( ctt >1  also needed), 
0),(),( 113112 <− trgtrg  
 
 
 
A unique ESS, multiple ESSs or no ESSs?  
 
We have an infinite set of candidate solutions given by the pair (r,t(r)), for all positive r, 
where t(r)is obtained from condition (4) and is non-decreasing with r, as soon as t(r) reaches 
ct  (recall that ct  is the value for which H( ct )= 1I =0). 
 
If t(r)< ct  for all values of r, then we know that all of these solutions are unstable, except 
possibly when r=0. This occurs if the optimal value of t in the limit as r tends to infinity is 
not greater than ct , i.e. 
 
0),(1 <∞ ctg  
 
so that 
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if (17) is true then t(0)< ct  and so for 1r =0 we have 1I <0. Thus there is a unique ESS at 
1r =0 if (13) and (17) hold, otherwise no ESSs if (17) but not(13) holds. 
 
If (17) does not hold, there will be multiple solutions with 1r >0, as well as a solution with 
1r =0 if and only if (13) holds. 
 
 
Non-point solutions 
 
It is possible to have a solution where not all of the population look alike. In particular there 
are sets of functions where no point solution is possible. Since, for sufficiently small a, 1r =0 
is always a solution when H( 1t )>0 we shall briefly consider the situation where H( 1t )<0. 
Inthis case each individual gives information of the non-toxicity of those that it resembles, 
so that it is best to look as little like the other species members as possible. For any given 
value of 1r ,it is clear that the best distribution over θ is a uniform one on (0,2pi). 
 
If a population follows this distribution of θ, then 
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In fact such a solution is unlikely to be stable, since it would be invaded by a small group 
that chooses a smaller r, and gets further in appearance from the others and reduces 
conspicuousness. A solution is likely to cover a range of values of 1r .Calculation and 
checking for stability in this case will be difficult for real functions, and will probably 
require numerical solutions. Any solution will be in the form of a density function 
P(r,θ)=C(r)/2pir, i.e. dependent on r but not θ. 
It will satisfy the following two conditions: 
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(i) the payoff to all individuals in the population must be identical 
(ii) C(r) is continuous and there will be a unique point, r( mr ), where C( mr )=0 (otherwise 
individuals could change to marginally larger r with greater payoff), giving 
 
∫=
rm
drrCN
0
)(  
 
Assuming that a=0, we expect a solution will be of the form  
 
1) D(w)Q( )(wI )=D(0)Q( )0(I ) for all w. 
 
2) C( mr )=0 
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We conjecture that there will usually be a unique solution of this type.  
 
 
Appendix2: Example functions 
 
We now consider some examples of the functions described above to show the type of 
solutions which can occur. 
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Finally the information function Q is given by  
 
( )



<−−
>
=
−
−
0,11
0,
)(
0
0
1
0
0
xeq
xeq
xQ
q
xkq
xκ
 
 
This yields a unique value for optimal t, given by 
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This general expression works only for t> ct  (the ratio of the derivative of Q and Q is a little 
more complex for t< ct , but the principle is no different). All solutions when t< ct are 
unstable unless r=0, as mentioned earlier. 
 
In the simplifying case where λ=a=0, we obtain 
 
)0,(1 βα −= Maxt , independently of r, which works whether ctt >1   or not. When α>β, 
inequality (4b) reduces to  
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which is clearly satisfied, confirming that the solution is stable. 
 
1r  =0 is an ESS if 
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When a=0 we obtain 
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for negative 1I   (it is trivially true for positive 1I  ). This is clearly satisfied when 1I  is near 
0 and when it is very large and negative, but possibly can be violated for intermediate 
values. Thus instability occurs in a critical range of information 1I   only, which for some 
parameters may be empty; if 1I   is large and negative then individuals are very attractive to 
predators and maximum camouflage is best, if 1I   is near zero individuals are slightly 
attractive to predators but cannot improve things much by changing appearance, so staying 
at r=0 is again best. For intermediate values individuals may be able to reduce their 
attractiveness by moving away from their current appearance, even though they will be 
discovered by predators more often. 1r  =0 is more likely to be a solution if the rate of 
decline of attacks as toxicity increases declines slowly, predators cannot identify differences 
between individuals for discriminatory purposes very well or camouflage is very effective. 
As long as a is not very large, the same pattern occurs for non-zero a. 
1r  >0 is an ESS if 
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This is only possible if 1I  >0. For a=0 we obtain 
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If further λ=0 then 
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which yields 
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so that any value of 1r   that is sufficiently large will be stable (and for some parameter 
values this will be true for all r, since R will be negative). Hence, beyond some threshold 
value of conspicuousness, any common form will be stable. 
 
